shock and awe

A strategy of rapidly decapitating leadership, destroying military capacity, and destroying war production.

A military doctrine Jiang summarizes as decapitating the enemy by cutting off the head so the body falls.

A post-2003 U.S. military doctrine Jiang describes as substituting air supremacy, technological omniscience, and special forces for traditional mass, supply, and public-support requirements.

The American warfighting capability Jiang associates with air supremacy, satellite surveillance, and special forces, making open attack on America suicidal for Iran.

He says U.S. shock and awe against Iran has failed because Iranian leadership, military, and factories are decentralized or hidden after 20 years of preparation.

Shock and awe fails against Iran because decentralized command and religious total war mean cutting off Tehran's head does not stop the rest of the body.

He argues that the U.S. military shifted after 2003 to shock and awe, a doctrine that relies on air supremacy, technological omniscience, and special forces to fight cheaply and quickly without the old public-support requirement.

Jiang argues that once the U.S.-led force appears ready to strike Tehran, the war has already been won by Iran because the invasion has violated basic traditional military doctrine.

In Jiang's reading, Nicias tried to deter the Athenians by demanding a massive expedition, but the warning backfired and made the Athenians embrace a shock-and-awe expedition.

Jiang says Iran cannot fight America in the open because U.S. shock and awe gives America air supremacy, satellite visibility, and special forces capabilities.

Jiang defines shock and awe as a doctrine that treats armies as hierarchies: cut off the head through air power, surveillance, and special forces, and the body collapses.

Jiang says the apparent success of the 2003 Iraq invasion made an initially unrealistic doctrine look confirmed: it was quick, relatively cheap for the United States, and decisive.