State planning

Used here through subsidy-driven data-center buildout and political direction of capital rather than through a purely market allocation process. Jiang's term for a political economy where the state and connected power centers direct capital, producing inefficient allocation and converging American and Chinese market structures.

He says states can engineer a financial crisis and then use draft structures to force work and teach practical skills, with military training functioning as a more useful education system than ordinary schools.

Jiang says state simplification destroys resilience: monoculture forests and top-down farming look efficient but become fragile under disease, drought, weather, or crisis.

Jiang says he does not place much weight on China's five-year plans because China's recurring long-run problem is inefficient capital allocation under state planning.

Jiang's model is that state planning sends capital to people closest to power rather than to the most energetic or innovative producers.

Jiang says this political allocation problem has persisted across Chinese history for roughly four thousand years, so contemporary modernization language does not change the underlying pattern.

Jiang concludes that the basic problem remains poor state planning that produces excess capacity.

Jiang argues that America and China are moving toward the same state-planning and state-financing model, which misallocates capital away from smaller productive businesses.