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The incentive to collapse the system comes when betting against defaults becomes more profitable than keeping borrowers current.
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The incentive to collapse the system comes when betting against defaults becomes more profitable than keeping borrowers current.
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"And these became very risky loans. Okay? And this led, of course, to 2008 when the entire thing collapsed. Okay? All right. So, the..."
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"You understand what happened? Okay? So, think about this. Okay. I lend $1 million to Amber. Okay? And everyone, $10,000. But then, suddenly, you..."
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"Now, what I do, now I make you default because now I can make a million dollars from Vincent. And that's how it worked,..."
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